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In these philosophers [i.e. Kant, Fichte, and Schelling], revolution 
was lodged and expressed as if in the very form of their thought.
Hegel1
Abstract
Can we understand (German) idealism as emancipatory today, 
after the new realist critique? In this paper, I argue that we can do so by 
identifying a political theology of revolution and utopia at the theoretical heart 
of German Idealism. First, idealism implies a certain revolutionary event 
at its foundation. Kant’s Copernicanism is ingrained, methodologically 
and ontologically, into the idealist system itself. Secondly, this 
revolutionary origin remains a “non-place” for the idealist system, which 
thereby receives a utopian character. I define the utopian as the ideal gap, 
produced by and from within the real, between the non-place of the real 
as origin and its reduplication as the non-place of knowledge’s closure, 
as well as the impulse, inherent in idealism, to attempt to close that gap 
and fully replace the old with the new. Based on this definition, I outline 
how the utopian functions in Kant, Fichte and Hegel. Furthermore, I 
suggest that idealism may be seen as a political-theological offshoot of 
realism, via the objective creation of a revolutionary condition. The origin 
of the ideal remains in the real, maintaining the utopian gap and the 
essentially critical character of idealism, both at the level of theory and as 
social critique. 
Keywords: Kant, Fichte, Hegel, idealism, revolution, utopia 
The goal of this paper is to revisit the political-theological concept 
of utopia as applicable to German Idealism today, after the new realist 
critique – “utopia” not merely as an “idealistic” political vision, but as 
a revolutionary condition inscribed within (German) idealist thought. 
I will attempt to identify the locus of the utopian at the level of the 
German Idealist theory, thereby providing a theoretical foundation for 
understanding German Idealism as a form of utopian and revolutionary 
thought – a thought of utopia and revolution. Ernst Bloch placed 
his concept of utopia in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition; Louis Marin 
found a “utopic” principle of the “neutral” in Kant; Daniel Whistler 
1  Hegel 1970, 20, p. 313.
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importantly sees it inherent in Schelling’s concept of abstraction.2 For 
my consideration of the utopian, I will turn to what I see as a common 
problem in Kant, Fichte and Hegel – the problem of the origin (or 
production) of idealist thought as such. I also hope that this analysis 
might prove useful for understanding what “idealism” is or how it is 
produced, and why it is what it is – namely, I suggest, a utopian critique.
The goal of this paper is, in other words, to look, not for ways out 
of idealism, but for a new way in. I see the concept of utopia as precisely 
such an alternative point of entry. Since Quentin Meillassoux has taken 
the Kantian-Hegelian “correlationism” to be the paradigmatic case of 
anti-realism,3 I will follow his lead and, while not denying Meillassoux’s 
indictment of correlationism or the related charges that some important 
Schellingian scholars make, attempt to identify the revolutionary and 
the utopian as two commitments and structural similarities, beyond 
correlationism, that German Idealism may entail. Along the way, I will 
suggest that idealism may be seen, onto- and anthropologically, as 
an anti-realist offshoot of realism from within realism, the creation of a 
revolutionary condition (a division between the old and the new) and a 
utopian impulse (towards a full transformation of the old) through which 
idealism itself receives a utopian character. It is thus precisely the “anti-” 
in German Idealism’s “anti-realism” that will interest me here – and so I 
will turn to consider Kant together with the two, so to speak, most idealist 
of German Idealist philosophers, Fichte and Hegel. The essence of 
this “anti-” can, I will argue, be encapsulated in three terms: revolution, 
retrospectivity, and utopia.
1.
Since the entire German Idealism may be said to be engaged in the 
task of revisiting Kant, we would do well to begin by doing the same. As 
is well known, Kant’s critical or transcendental idealism begins with a 
self-proclaimed revolutionary gesture known as the “Copernican turn,” 
involving a delineation of what we can and cannot know, and therefore a 
division between two perspectives, of knowledge and of the unknowable. 
As soon as a rational being begins to cognize the world, it is not the 
2  Bloch 1986; Marin 1984; Whistler 2015. I am thankful to Daniel Whistler for pointing me to 
Marin’s work.
3  Meillassoux 2008.
world as it may exist independently of us, or “an sich,”4 but the world as 
it appears to us that our mind explores, using the mind’s own a priori 
categories to give it a rational form. No knowledge of the world that 
would forego the categories inherent in our mind and know the world as 
it is “an sich” is possible. Such is Kant’s “correlationism,” as dubbed 
by Meillassoux. There has, of course, been a multitude of different 
readings of what exactly Kant means by the Ding an sich, but what matters 
here is the very existence of a certain world, point of view, set of inner 
qualities, or generally something which remains “outside” idealist 
knowledge and to which we have no cognitive access. The important 
point here is not that, if we were to know the in-itself, we would gain 
some new or “real” (kind of) knowledge – but the opposite: namely, that 
our (kind of) knowledge is itself something new compared to whatever 
or however things may be “in themselves” or independently of us. It is 
the Ding an sich as the ground of knowledge – the “unknown ground of 
phenomena” (A380),5 or the “true correlate of sensibility” (A30/B45) 
that is “unconditioned” (B xx) by sensibility – that I will call “the real” in 
Kant. The terms “ground” and “correlate of sensibility” point to Kant’s 
(in)famous claim, debated among Kantian scholars, that our sensibility 
is directly affected by the thing in itself – a position he explicitly and 
firmly defended against Beck’s and Fichte’s criticism.6 Interesting in this 
regard is also Kant’s talk of the transcendental object, the “inscrutable” 
ground of receptivity corresponding to the thing in itself, as the “basis 
of appearances” (A613/B641) that serves as a kind of indeterminate 
original guarantee of their unity (“the unity of the thought of a manifold 
in general,” A247/B304, or “the unity of the manifold in sensible intuition” 
as the “correlate of the unity of apperception”, A250). The transcendental 
object is essentially all that remains of the real strictly within idealism – 
an indeterminate ghost of the real, a haunting as well as a promise (of 
4  Kant himself does believe such a reality exists, since the “conclusion that there can be ap-
pearance without anything that appears” sounds “absurd” to him (B xxvi). We will see, however, that the 
exact nature of this reality does not matter for identifying the “utopian” structure of idealism.
5  From here onwards, “A” and “B” reference the two editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, as 
is customary in Kant scholarship. “AA” references the Akademie-Ausgabe (Kant 1900ff.).
6  See e.g. Westphal 2004; Addison 2013.
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reality).7 No less controversially, for Kant, the thing in itself causally brings 
about idealist knowledge, via a “causality that is not appearance, even 
though its effect is encountered in appearance” (B567). Both “ground” 
and “cause” suggest that, aside from being something new compared 
to the real, the ideal is a certain transformation of, and coming from 
within, the latter. As soon we as we have begun to cognize them, things 
change (for us); the transformation produces newness, but this newness 
originates as an affect of the real.
Of course, Kant’s idealism cannot claim knowledge of how exactly 
the grounding or the causality function or originate; neither, shall we 
see, can Fichte’s or Hegel’s idealism, despite doing away with the thing 
in itself sensu stricto. This fact – that there is no satisfactory idealist 
answer to the question of origin as origin, or that such an answer can 
only be retrospective (so that, according to Kant, we can and must think, 
but not “really” know this origin) – belongs to the essence of Kantian 
idealism as a doctrine of the new. Kant’s hypothesis of a causality 
between the noumena and the phenomena is controversial because 
it transphenomenally applies a concept within critical idealism to 
something that precedes and grounds it while not being a part of what we 
can legitimately know. It is, in other words, a retrospective hypothesis, in 
which idealist thought must think the old (the real) using the conceptual 
apparatus belonging to the new (the ideal). Considered in this way, 
Kant’s hypothesis serves a vital function within idealism as an example 
of the approximatory character of our knowledge (which strives to know 
the thing in itself but cannot do so – the noumenon as Grenzbegriff, “limit-
concept”8) and the closest we can come to appropriating the revolution 
of human knowledge (as the foundational event for idealist thought) to 
our ways of thinking.
As such, the thing in itself (and thus Kantian idealism) goes 
“beyond” correlationism in two directions at once. Namely, the real as 
the “limit-concept” works both ways: limiting our sensibility as the origin 
of idealist knowledge, it also limits how far this knowledge can go and 
7  Cf. Grier 2004, p. 84, after referencing Kant on the manifold being “given prior to the synthe-
sis of the understanding and independently of it” (B145-146): “At A110 Kant claims that this relation to 
an object is the necessary unity of consciousness and the synthesis of the manifold. The transcendental 
object, then, serves to account for the ability of thought … to refer to something given to it from else-
where (i.e., from “outside” thought). Indeed, in this very general and abstract sense, it may be viewed as 
the referent of such thought. In this way, the concept of the transcendental object acts to “confer upon 
all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality” (A 109-110).”
8  See e.g. A289/B345, or B307 on it as a “negative conception.”
where the mind has to stop in its progress. In a sort of reduplication, 
the unknown that affects our sensibility – the real as origin – re-appears 
as the unattainable closure of knowledge, creating a fundamental gap 
that “leaves open a space which we can fill neither through possible 
experience nor through pure understanding” (A289/B345). From the 
standpoint of idealist knowledge, the real is a “non-place”: we can 
retrospectively point to it (as a gap), we can think it as empty, but we 
cannot incorporate it fully into the newness that has broken away from 
it. Kant himself speaks of the noumenon as “empty for us,” so that “we” 
(i.e. we as embodying the ideal) “are unable to comprehend how such 
noumena can be possible” (A255). We can thus approximate the limit, 
but never reach it or close the gap.
It is this ideal gap, produced by and from within the real, between 
the non-place of the real as origin and its re-duplication as the non-place 
of knowledge’s closure, as well as the impulse, inherent in idealism, to 
attempt to close that gap and fully re-place the old with the new, that I 
would like to call utopian. Thus understood, the utopian has newness, or 
the revolutionary break of the ideal, as its objective condition. This is also 
a different way of looking at Jacobi’s critique of Kant’s transcendental 
idealism in David Hume on Faith, or Idealism and Realism, where Jacobi says 
of the thing in itself that we cannot enter Kantian idealism without it, and 
cannot remain within it if we accept it (“ohne jene Voraussetzung in das 
System nicht hineinkommen, and mit jener Voraussetzung darinnen nicht 
bleiben konnte”9). 
Jacobi’s criticism perceptively identifies the core problematic 
at the heart of idealism; if we separate it from the specific textual 
problems with Kant’s concept of the thing in itself, we may regard as 
something constitutive of idealism. Namely, already in Kant and already 
in its underlying theoretical foundation, idealism defines itself through 
a dissatisfaction with the status quo of the real, seeing itself not as 
continuous but as proceeding from a radical break with the real in a 
utopian impulse pointing towards the second non-place, that of the 
system’s closure, also inconceivable if we want to “remain within the 
system.” To be sure, there are many “conservative” moments to be 
found in Kant’s further theoretical and practical elaboration of idealism 
(although one might argue those are inevitably needed to escape the 
permanent revolution and to structure the new), but this theoretical 
foundation remains and even becomes morally and politically radicalized 
9  Jacobi 2004, p. 109.
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in Kant’s conception of “revolution” and “new man” in his Religion Within 
the Boundaries of Mere Reason. In the next sections of this paper, we will 
see the utopian re-appear in different variations, but always inextricable 
from the figure of the origin (of idealist thought).
2. 
(Kantian) idealism is thus revolutionary. Politically, the real is 
the status quo against which the ideal revolts. Moreover, this revolution 
has its objective “cause” or “ground” in the real; we may say it is the 
real that revolts against itself, producing a standpoint of newness that 
can only retrospectively point to the old, but leaves the real as such 
behind. The Copernican revolution is not only methodological, and 
not only a revolution in thought, but may be regarded as producing 
a revolutionary division between the old and the new within itself – 
at the very foundation of idealist epistemology, ontology, and even 
anthropology (with the human being as the primary case of the rational 
being to which the knowledge of the phenomenal world corresponds). 
I call this division “revolutionary” not only because of Kant’s use of the 
term in the Religionsschrift, or because it sharply distinguishes the new 
from the old, but also because it is radical, discarding its origin (which 
remains) just as it proceeds from and transforms it, looking at the world 
from the standpoint of the new as the “end in itself.” Newness in thought 
turns out to be a thought of newness. The real as “ground” or “cause” 
indicates that we must think this revolution as at once immanent (if 
considered immanently or prospectively from the standpoint of the real) 
and transcendent (if considered retrospectively from the standpoint of 
the ideal).
Unsurprisingly, we find the same retrospective indication of a 
revolutionary origin, and a similar utopian gap, in Kant’s philosophy 
of history. Here, Kant starts from the new – the birth of knowledge, 
freedom, and morality – as a fact, as if man produced it “completely from 
within himself” (as if “der Mensch alles, was über die mechanische 
Anordnung seines tierischen Daseins geht, gänzlich aus sich selbst 
herausbringe”10). This is why the “beginning” of history can only be 
“presumable” or “conjectural” for Kant (“mutmaßlicher Anfang”). 
Objectively, it is as if humankind were propelled – in a sort of “thrust,”11 
10  AA 8:19.
11  AA 8:114.
“drive”12 or “release”13 – to break from nature and the animal condition by 
some sort of external force or stimulus; this external ground, however, 
is, again, the real (or “nature”). On the one hand, “if one is not to be 
overenthusiastic in one’s speculations, then one must begin with that 
which cannot be derived by human reason from preceding causes of 
nature: the existence of a human being”; on the other, “nature has made 
this beginning.”14 Of course, just like with the thing in itself, we cannot 
from the idealist standpoint know how exactly the beginning of history 
happens. For idealism, the origin of history is essentially a self-positing, 
an I = I.15 Kant is driven to retrospectively postulate a divide between 
the old and the new, such as in his remark, in the Conjectural Beginning 
of Human History, that our “ground” is divided into two predispositions, 
the animal and the moral (“daß die Natur in uns zwei Anlagen zu zwei 
verschiedenen Zwecken, nämlich der Menschheit als Tiergattung und 
eben derselben als sittlicher Gattung gegründet habe”16). There is a 
division here, and the real cause of this division is “grounded” in and by 
nature.
This division manifests itself also, theologically, in Kant’s 
interpretation of the Genesis and the Fall, as well as in the framework 
underlying his Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher 
Absicht (except this time reduplicated or inverted towards the future). 
“Everything begins with evil,” says Kant.17 The evil and the Fall are 
interpreted as the beginning of knowledge. The common criticism that 
Kant does not make evil intelligible to us, may also be seen as inherent 
in the revolutionary standpoint to which Kant adheres. In the Conjectural 
Beginning, Kant himself speaks of that division as “a gap” that idealist 
thought cannot “endeavor to fill”18 – a phrase that echoes the “open 
space” that “cannot be filled” from the Critique of Pure Reason, referenced 
earlier – as well as emphasizes the revolutionary character of reason by 
pointing out, here as well as elsewhere in Kant’s practical philosophy, 
12  AA 8:115.
13  AA 8:114.
14  AA 8:109-10.
15  Cf. Philonenko 1986, p. 152ff.
16  AA 8:117.
17  AA 15/2:615; cf. AA 8:115.
18  AA 8:110.
334 335Spirit and Utopia: (German) Idealism as Political Theology Spirit and Utopia: (German) Idealism as Political Theology
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
V
O
L.
2
I
S
S
U
E
#1
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
V
O
L.
2
I
S
S
U
E
#1
that reason is free to act “contrary to” natural urges. Further, again, 
Kant can only hypothesize about nature in his philosophy of history by 
proceeding from the standpoint of idealist theory and from how “we” can 
think nature from where we are now.
This sort of anti-naturalism is not be to understood literally, but 
as part of the same distinction between the standpoint of the old or 
the “an sich,” and the standpoint of the new or the ideal. From within 
idealist thought, the ideal can only be cognized as if it were a product 
of a revolutionary creation from nothing, even as we retrospectively 
think (but not know) its objective origin in the real. Kant’s disagreement 
with Herder also has its origin here. Herder, with his insistence on the 
cognizable real ground not just of the human body, but reason, Humanität, 
and freedom as well,19 is from idealism’s point of view a “dogmatist,” as 
Kant calls him,20 adhering to the kind of natural status quo from which 
idealism revolted. Idealism, by contrast, is revolutionary, not cumulative. 
Kant criticizes Herder for making the principle of thought into an 
“effect” of “invisible nature”; however, idealism itself has its “ground” 
and “cause” in the real – it is just that it is a retrospective critique of 
the real and a utopian attempt at its full and radical transformation, 
not its endorsement as such. It is in this “as such” that the root of the 
disagreement between Kant and Herder lies.
In his theoretical philosophy, Kant identifies the real with the 
domain of things as they are by themselves; in his philosophy of history, 
with nature – but not nature as we cognize it. At the point of the origin, 
there is yet no “we”; “we” can only point to that origin by looking back at 
it. Only by virtue of our morality, says Kant, i.e. at the culmination of the 
ideal and looking back at the origin, can we (retrospectively) consider 
ourselves to be the end goal of nature.21 
This move will be repeated in Fichte and Hegel, because 
for idealism, the origin is interesting not as origin, but only as a 
transformation of that origin as enacted by (idealist) thought. From the 
standpoint of the ideal, the origin is, literally, nothing. Herder indicts 
19  “…von der Nahrung und Fortpflanzung der Gewächse stieg der Trieb zum Kunstwerk der 
Insekten, zur Haus- und Muttersorge der Vögel und Landtiere, endlich gar zu Menschen-ähnlichen 
Gedanken und zu eignen selbst erworbnen Fertigkeiten; bis sich zuletzt alles in der Vernunftfähigkeit, 
Freiheit und Humanität des Menschen vereinet” (Herder 1989, p. 166).
20  AA 8:54.
21  AA 8:114.
Kant’s “Beleidigung der Natur-Majestät,”22 but he misses the point, which 
is revolutionary. Idealism “deprecates” the natural because it sees it as 
part of, and complicit with, the old status quo of the real. We will see this 
in Hegel, too, who disregards nature as origin while praising nature as 
“idealized” by Geist. This is not a contradiction, but a consequence of the 
transformative character of the ideal. If idealism were to envisage nature 
as such on the side of the new and as part of the revolution, the attitude 
could be different. Is that perhaps what happens in Schelling?
The political aspect of Kant’s utopian idealism, manifest in 
the progress of human history as an “infinite process of gradual 
approximation” towards a “perpetual peace,”23 becomes political-
theological in the Religionsschrift. Here, the utopian re-appears, 
along with the themes of evil or the uncognizable “innateness” of the 
beginning, as the impulse towards a full reformation of the human being 
and community, and as the gap between infinite approximation and 
“revolution” in the creation of the “new man.” Far from being purely 
moral or theological, the utopian here is fundamentally political, insofar 
as Kant speaks of a “revolution in our mode of thought” that “will not 
be brought about solely through the striving of one individual person 
… but requires rather a union of such persons into a whole toward 
that end.”24 Here, idealist thought of newness becomes explicitly a 
political theology of revolution. In Kant’s articulation of “revolution,” an 
important reversal takes place, inherent in the utopian, a transposal of 
the original revolution into the future. From the standpoint of the real, 
as we suggested, the ideal (i.e., for Kant, human thought, morality, and 
politics) is something new. However, from the standpoint of the ideal 
(i.e. from within the unfolding of the new), it is the closure of the original 
gap – the attainment of perfect knowledge and morality – which appears 
as the future “revolution.” There can be no “conservative” return to the 
origin from within idealism, and the original non-place’s transposition 
into the future makes the real function not as the old, but a new reality 
22  Herder 1989, p. 335.
23  AA 8:386.
24  AA 6: 97-8. Space does not permit me to go into detail about the Religionsschrift here, but 
see e.g. Wood 1999, p. 314.
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(of perfection or absoluteness).25 The old is thus reduplicated as the new 
new; the full transformation desired by the ideal in a sense returns to the 
real (retrospectivity) in an attempt to incorporate the remainder and join 
idealism back with realism. This makes idealism itself utopian.
3.
The thing in itself in the narrow sense does, of course, go away 
in Fichte, but not the specific non-place that it occupied. The utopian 
in the sense outlined above, as the ideal gap between the old and the 
new real, remains. Fichte “never tired of insisting that … the underlying 
‘spirit’ of the Critical philosophy and the Wissenschaftslehre were one 
and the same”;26 as a result, the problem of the origin of idealism as 
such is constitutive for the Grundlage des gesammten Wissenschaftslehre 
(1794/95), too. Despite popular opinion, the science of knowing does 
not involve only and merely a pure self-positing of the I, or what Jacobi 
called a “speculative egoism.”27 Rather, Fichte takes up (and transforms) 
precisely the term “Ding an sich” when discussing the uncognizable 
origin of idealism and its connection to the real, which remains a 
“something” at the limit of the system.
“Das Ding an sich ist etwas für das Ich, und folglich im Ich, das 
doch nicht im Ich seyn soll: also etwas widersprechendes, das aber 
dennoch als Gegenstand einer nothwendigen Idee allem unseren 
Philosophiren zum Grunde gelegt werden muss, und von jeher, nur 
ohne dass man sich desselben und des in ihm liegenden Widerspruchs 
deutlich bewusst war, allem Philosophiren, und allen Handlungen 
des endlichen Geistes zu Grunde gelegen hat. Auf dieses Verhältniss 
des Dinges an sich zum Ich gründet sich der ganze Mechanismus des 
menschlichen und aller endlichen Geister.”28 
“The thing-in-itself is something for the self, and consequently 
in the self, though it ought not to be in the self: it is thus a contradiction, 
though as the object of a necessary idea it must be set at the foundation 
25  In this point, this paper’s ‘theoretical’ definition of the utopian is in agreement with Bloch’s 
principle of hope, and his famous statement that “the true genesis is not at the beginning, but at the end, 
and it will only start to come about when society and existence become radical, i.e. take themselves 
by their own roots” (Bloch 1986, pp. 1375-6). Bloch takes these “roots” to be the non-alienated human; 
here, I take the origin to mean the utopian non-place conditioned by a revolution of the real.
26  Breazeale 2000, p. 172.
27  Jacobi 2004, p. 112. Cf. Arndt and Jaeschke 2012, p. 72.
28  Fichte 1965, p. 413.
of all our philosophizing, and has always lain at the root of all philosophy 
and all acts of the finite mind, save only that no one has been clearly 
aware of it, or of the contradiction contained therein. This relation of the 
thing-in-itself to the self forms the basis for the entire mechanism of the 
human and all other finite minds.”29
Essentially, Fichte thereby identifies the foundation of the 
relationship between the real and the ideal in idealism. What he calls 
the contradictory approximates what I call the utopian (at least as 
origin), and what he calls the thing in itself is the formal point of entry 
into “the non-subjective origin of the existence of appearances.”30 It is 
“formal” insofar as it can point to the fact of the origin in the real, but 
not to the “how,” since the “how” is unknowable by the ideal. Not only is 
the “Non-I” posited by the I, but also the other way around – the I gets 
the first “Anstoß,” impetus or impulse, from the Non-I, resulting in a 
“Wechsel” between the Non-I and the I that constitutes the “ultimate 
ground,” uncognizable from within the Wissenschaftslehre, so that “the 
ultimate ground of all consciousness is an interaction of the I with itself 
via a Non-I considered in its various aspects” (“der letzte Grund alles 
Bewußtseyns ist eine Wechselwirkung des Ich mit sich selbst vermittelst 
eines von verschiedenen Seiten zu betrachtenden Nicht-Ich”31). The real 
remains “in the I” as something that “ought not to be in the I,” something 
belonging to the old and not to the new, thereby making it the goal of the 
ideal to fully this remainder of the real. We see here the same utopian 
impulse we saw in Kant, driving the idealist knowledge forward towards 
something that defines its limit. Fichte himself acknowledges this 
kind of constitutive ambivalence of his (and all true, non-“dogmatic”) 
idealism by calling it a “Real-Idealismus” or “Ideal-Realismus.”32 The first 
impulse thus again comes from within the non-place of the real, defining 
idealism as a utopian repulsion, via the Anstoß, of the ideal against and 
by the real. As a result, contra Jacobi, even the “most decisive idealism” 
(“kräftigster Idealismus”) does not need to endorse “speculative 
egoism” (“spekulativer Egoismus”),33 as that would deprive it of the 
utopian character that drives it towards the new.
29  Fichte 1982, p. 249.
30  Kuhne 2007, p. 164.
31  Fichte 1965, p. 413.
32  Fichte 1965, p. 412. 
33  Jacobi 2004, p. 112.
338 339Spirit and Utopia: (German) Idealism as Political Theology Spirit and Utopia: (German) Idealism as Political Theology
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
V
O
L.
2
I
S
S
U
E
#1
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
V
O
L.
2
I
S
S
U
E
#1
In a historical as well as an explicitly political-theological 
context, the utopian impulse re-appears in Fichte’s Die Grundzüge des 
gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, where the division between the old and the new 
takes the form of the unknowable beginning of history. In Lecture IX, 
Fichte speaks of a “normal people” at the origin of history, contrasting 
it with “historical” peoples, so that the beginning of history proper 
consists for Fichte in a diasporic dispersal of the “normal people” and 
its mélange with the “barbarians” that surround it – a mélange which 
gives birth to history: “The Normal People must therefore, by some 
occurrence or other, have been driven away from their habitations … and 
must have been dispersed over the seats of Barbarism. Now for the first 
time could the process of the free development of the Human Race begin; 
and with it, History, the record of the Unexpected and the New, which 
accompanies such a process. …now, for the first time, could History, 
properly so called, have a beginning.”34 
History thus, as the ideal “record of the new,” has in Fichte the 
same kind of revolutionary beginning it had in Kant – and just as the 
“Ding an sich” in the Wissenschaftslehre, the non-place of “normalcy” 
remains in the intermixture of the diasporic mélange as something that 
does not properly belong but remains there, a productivity driving spirit 
towards the utopian closure of knowledge and history. The political 
aspect of this closure is envisaged by Fichte as an expressly utopian 
future – the final “age” or “epoch” of humankind – in which “true science” 
and “true religion” are fully realized and actual. In a familiar move, the old 
real re-surfaces as the new: the break with the “normalcy” of the origin 
as the normative newness at history’s end. Importantly, nature returns 
here, too, as part of the “true religion” and therefore as belonging to the 
new; this new nature is, of course, not merely a return of the old – it has 
rather been transformed and “developed,” so that “what is the Law of 
Nature to other” is to the true religion “the development of the seemingly 
dead carrier of the original life” (“die Entwickelung des als ertödtet 
erscheinenden Trägers des ersten Lebens”),35 i.e. a transformative 
return of the origin. The point of the utopian is, further, not whether or 
not such a future is possible in the form that Fichte gives it, but that the 
present, as the actuality of the utopian gap, is the constant generation 
“of the unexpected and the new” precisely thanks to its (ever actual) 
34  Fichte 1848, p. 138.
35  Fichte 1848, p. 248 (translation altered).
revolutionary condition. It is the incessant practice of newness that finds it 
culmination in Fichte’s political-theological vision of a future society.
Fichte’s characteristic of the ideal as the production “of the 
unexpected and the new,” as well as his rethinking of the “Ding an sich,” 
point also to another aspect of idealism’s theory of knowledge that 
goes beyond correlationism. Meillassoux is correct to point out that 
idealism “supplants the adequation between the representations … and 
the thing itself as the veritable criterion of objectivity”;36 both Kant and 
Fichte show, moreover, that it is the real that provides the impulse for 
not conforming to the in-itself. Newness must go against the way things 
are, arriving at a correlationism only because, for the German idealists, 
we are the agent and “effect” of this transformation (as “caused” or 
“grounded” in the real). That is also why, as Meillassoux critically points 
out, for Kant scientific truth belongs to “a scientific community.”37 The 
original condition or, in Fichte’s terms, the “ultimate ground” of idealism 
is thus not correlationism, but the fact of the revolutionary production 
of newness from within the in-itself. In place of the merely adequate, 
idealism puts the utopian.
4.38
Hegel characterizes spirit, inter alia, as an activity of “ideality,” 
Idealität, or “idealization”, Idealisierung.39 In Hegel, we find the actual 
beginning of Geist, or the ideal, as the new contrasted with the old, right 
at the start of his Philosophy of Spirit, in what he calls the “anthropology” – 
his doctrine of “the soul,” encompassing sensation, individuality, and the 
unconscious. Anthropologically, the definition of spirit as idealization 
is, according to Hegel, one of the most significant,40 so that the entire 
logic of the anthropology, from the “natural soul” to the “actual soul” and 
the transition to consciousness, turns out to be a logic of the ideal. As a 
logical-philosophical systematization of the realm of the pre-conscious, 
Hegel’s anthropology may be regarded as taking up the challenge of 
36  Meillassoux 2008, pp. 4-5.
37  Meillassoux 2008, pp. 15.
38  This section recapitulates some of the arguments found in a more fleshed-out form in Chepu-
rin 2015, where I argue for the importance of Hegel’s anthropology to his Naturphilosophie.
39  See e.g. §381Z. or Hegel 1994, p. 30. References to Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the Philo-
sophical Sciences are given via references to the relevant paragraph, with an additon of “A.” for an 
Anmerkung or “Z.” for a Zusatz where required.
40  §403A.
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illuminating precisely the Wechselwirkung between the real and the ideal, 
the mind and the Non-I, of which Fichte spoke.41 However, as the very 
term “idealization” implies, this Wechselwirkung is in Hegel decidedly one-
sided – it’s all about spirit and how it transforms itself and nature, and 
not about nature as such, this “as such” remaining, again, beyond the 
confines of the system proper.
Just like in Kant and Fichte, the figure of the origin appears at 
the beginning of the Hegelian Geist via a revolutionary condition. The 
anthropology follows the development of the individual human soul right 
from its birth. This birth is defined by Hegel as an “absolute negativity”42 
and a “saltus”43 – an emergence that takes place within nature but 
immediately goes beyond it, a leap from Natur to Geist, to the “immediate 
spirit”44 that “must be grasped as spirit” and not as nature.45 Spirit, 
says Hegel in his lectures on the philosophy of history, can only begin 
“from spirit.”46 We see here the idealist move, in which, right from its 
moment of birth and even while still apparently “captivated”47 by nature, 
spirit is already defined by its opposition to the latter. What Hegel calls 
the “natural soul” deals precisely with this non-real “captivity,” the 
remainder of “natural influences and changes” in the soul that do not 
properly belong to it, just as it was with the Non-I’s remainder that we 
saw in Fichte. As the first form of the ideal, the “natural soul” has already 
left the nature as such “behind”; its origin in the real now “lies behind” 
it, says Hegel.48 To further emphasize the ideal as the new compared 
to the real, Hegel describes the event of the soul’s birth as a “play of 
the absolute spirit with itself,” in which the absolute directly “posits” 
the individual soul49 in a sort of creatio ex nihilo (as seen from within the 
system).
41  Cf. Greene 1972 on Hegel’s anthropology as an anti-Cartesian exploration of the realm of the 
pre-conscious from within (Kantian) idealism.
42  §§381-382.
43  Hegel 1994, p. 52.
44  §387; Hegel 1994, p. 31.
45  Hegel 1994, p. 11. Cf. Hegel 1994, pp. 3, 20, 30.
46  Cited in Stederoth 2001, p. 106.
47  §387Z.; cf. §385Z.
48  §§391, 391Z.
49  Hegel 1994, p. 31.
What follows after that in the anthropology – and what defines 
its logic and structure – is an examination of how and where the 
soul proceeds in the wake of its “absolute” break from nature. 
Characteristically, the ideal immediately starts to transform the world 
that surrounds it, disregarding its independence as something 
irrelevant (which is manifest for Hegel even in such basic interaction 
of the soul with the world as the first cry of the human child or the 
way the child denies the “an sich” of the external world by breaking 
its toys and generally anything it comes across50). Hegel’s theory of 
this transformation constitutes his account of sensation, Empfindung, 
understood by him not as receptivity, but as a structured transformation 
of both the soul and the world that surrounds it. In §401, Hegel defines it 
as a cycle of Verleiblichung and Erinnerung. On the one hand, the soul can 
reach out to and “idealize” a particular “immediate” (i.e. given or natural) 
sensation, “make it internal” (“innerlich gemacht”51), place it inside 
itself (Erinnerung) as another building block of its inner world.52 On the 
other, the soul can reach inside its Fürsichsein for a particular feeling – a 
memory of or a reaction to a sensation53 – that it then enacts externally 
(Verleiblichung). “Pure corporeality is not sensation; it must erinnern itself, 
and vice versa, the purely inner must verleiblichen itself.”54 That which 
comes from within the soul, claims Hegel, must be verleiblicht in order 
for the soul to “discover” it (“in order to be sensed, this content must be 
verleiblicht”55) – it must become part of the surrounding world, influencing 
and transforming it.
In Verleiblichung and Erinnerung, says Hegel, the “natural” is 
“idealized” towards the “posited totality of its [i.e. the soul’s] particular 
world”56 that includes its “inner” as well as, crucially, its “outer” world. 
This is why Hegel defines the soul’s activity of “idealization” not only 
50  See e.g. Hegel 1994, p. 53.
51  §401.
52  Hegel plays here on the German word Erinnerung (usually translated as “recollection”), 
breaking it down into Er-innerung, “internalization.” In this Er-innerung, the particular sensation in ques-
tion is negated so that, according to the way Hegel wants us to understand negation in the note to §403, 
it is “virtually preserved even if it does not exist” (emphasis mine).
53  Hegel 1994, p. 84.
54  Hegel 1994, p. 86. Cf. Hegel 1994, p. 131.
55  Hegel 1994, p. 84.
56  §403A.
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as knowledge, but also as “appropriation” or “assimilation” of the 
world to spirit (“Idealisierung oder Assimilation”57). This is not merely 
a “metaphorical” assimilation; it is, on the contrary, the soul’s body 
and its material power that allows it to appropriate and transform its 
surroundings. The soul defines its “individuality” by the “totality,” 
Totalität, of the things it touches or digests, the things it “fills” itself with 
(Erfüllung made actual, “posited” as a process of “subjectivity”58). The 
soul does not simply consume what is given; it is always in the process 
of the “positing of nature as its [i.e. Geist’s] own world,” as Hegel 
characterizes it in §384. 
The Wechselwirkung of sensation therefore does not leave nature 
“as it is.” What Geist starts to cognize as the “external world” at the end 
of the anthropology and the transition to the phenomenology, is not 
nature as origin, but as already “assimilated” by spirit. This is further 
confirmed by Hegel’s pointing out, in his lectures, that the condition 
for the philosophy of nature is for spirit to approach nature “geistig 
liebend,”59 i.e., “in a spiritually loving way” or “with spiritual love.” 
Philosophical knowledge of nature proceeds from within the ideal, not 
nature “as such,” and is therefore retrospective. If we turn again to 
Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit in the Philosophie des Geistes, we 
will see that knowledge of the external world originates for him in the 
phenomenology, which follows the anthropology. Hence, by the time 
spirit can think nature, this nature is already transformed. Prior to the 
transition from the anthropology to the phenomenology, no philosophical 
knowledge of nature is possible. Like all idealist philosophy, philosophy 
of nature is for Hegel retrospective – it retrospectively traces how nature 
leads up to spirit from the standpoint of spirit itself. After suggesting 
that any true philosophy of nature must approach nature “geistig 
liebend,” Hegel remarks that “the highest foundation of such a study 
of nature lies within the human.”60 Even if we assume that nature can be 
idealized fully, this idealization will fail to be simply identical with nature-
as-origin, because any such identity must necessarily first go through us 
as the ideal. 
57  §381Z.; emphasis mine.
58  §403.
59  Hegel 2007, p. 3.
60  Hegel 2002, p. 6.
5.
Hegel thus, too, is not concerned with knowledge of the origin as 
it is. Philosophy, and therefore knowledge, of the real must necessarily 
go through the ideal, thereby becoming retrospective, so that the system 
in a sense unfolds from spirit back to nature. The Philosophy of Nature’s 
place within the Encyclopedia is a sign of this idealist retrospectivity, and 
not of a continuous evolutionary progression from Natur to Geist – hence 
also its ambivalence as both a critique of nature and a demonstration of 
how it may “point to”61 spirit (from within spirit). Spirit marks the “utopic 
stage” (Louis Marin) between the non-place of the real, from which the 
ideal revolts in a “play of the absolute spirit with itself” (the “saltus” 
which is the birth of a human soul), and this play’s re-duplication as the 
absolute spirit “proper” at the system’s closure. In this play, the absolute 
is defined as being something new – a new beginning – compared to the 
real. Hegel aims to break with the thing in itself completely, even more 
so than Fichte, and he does so within the system, but precisely because 
idealism is utopian as predicated on a revolutionary condition, it needs 
the origin as something that remains.
The political theology of revolution and utopia inscribed in 
Hegel’s philosophy of spirit also entails the political in the classical 
sense – in the sense of the community. In the anthropology, every birth 
of a human soul is a “saltus.” Thus, every such birth is a revolution, and 
since, anthropologically, Geist “has its actual truth only as singularity 
(Einzelheit)”62 and the soul is the first form of Geist, spirit as such has 
its first actual existence precisely as an anthropological multiplicity 
of embodied individualities, all born from within the real in a constant 
re-enactment of the revolutionary saltus. (At the same time, every new 
birth is a new break with the real, therefore requiring the real, so that the 
non-place is re-enacted, too.) The utopian impulse becomes thereby not 
only the general progress of idealist knowledge and history – it becomes 
ontoanthropologically embodied as Geist, with every individual in the 
community as an actor on this utopian stage. In Hegel’s anthropology, 
“we” are the absolute and “we” are the utopian. Every single event of 
revolution is incomplete, and the utopian is that which bridges the event 
and its full enactment; consequently, utopia may serve as another name 
for Geist. This may be called the ontological “practice” of the utopian (or 
61  See e.g. §381Z.
62  §391.
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the absolute), which follows from its “theory.”
If we take the anthropological origin seriously – and throughout 
the anthropology, Hegel seems confident that his theory of the individual 
is supposed to flow naturally into his theory of Gemeinwesen, grounding 
the latter – then we will have to accept that, in Hegel, the seemingly 
stable community and social institutions rest on a volatile, revolutionary 
anthropological foundation. Here, however, is where the mature Hegel’s 
“conservatism” comes into play. If Fichte is happy with history being the 
production of “the unexpected and the new,” and with philosophically 
imagining completely new forms of science, life, and society as the 
closure of the utopian gap, Hegel is not. The utopian structure of idealist 
theory remains, but its temporality is altered: in contrast to Fichte and 
Kant, for Hegel the future is already here in a fundamentally actual sense 
– in the anthropological sense of being re-embodied in every new saltus, 
together forming a cohering, progressive ethical whole that he calls “das 
Werk der Welt.”63 Hegel does not need to think the “new man,” as Kant 
does, because for him every soul is the “new man.” As a result, Hegel’s 
social theory, and his concept of Sittlichkeit, are a re-configuration and a 
re-affirmation of forms of life that are already there.  
The revolutionary is the multitudal, but Hegel only needs this 
multitude as a sittliche whole, perhaps because he is wary of its 
revolutionary potential. In the Philosophy of Spirit, he endorses the 
spirit of newness because he requires the productivity granted by the 
utopian impulse, only to then attempt to reign it in because only in this 
way, as put under control, that he sees it being productive instead of 
destructive. The destructive aspect of this revolution is sharply criticized 
by Hegel in the anthropology – for instance, in his analysis of “youth” 
and “adolescence” as something which the “mature man” must grow 
out of.64 The adolescent embodies in Hegel the revolutionary taken to 
the extreme: not content with opposing itself to the natural status quo, 
the adolescent by extension opposes himself to the status quo of society 
(“goes against the world”). The adolescent is the point at which the 
ideal becomes too “idealistic,” and as such it is, of course, derided by 
Hegel. Further, the same destructivity re-appears in the anthropology 
in the guise of madness, the third and most dangerous type of which, 
“frenzy” or “mania” (Wahnsinn), bears an uncanny structural similarity 
63  Hegel 1994, p. 55; §391Z.
64  Hegel 1994, p. 55; §396Z.
to adolescence: just like the adolescent, the madman is driven to enact 
his abstract anti-social idea by means of destroying the social.65 Hegel 
prefers to normalize or exclude the anti-social, and that is why he is so 
keen to downplay the individual’s contribution to the “Werk der Welt,” 
insisting on the latter’s predominantly “objective” character (“the self-
executing work of the world”66) as a sort of invisible hand for which only 
the sum total of the anthropological vectors matters.
Aside from the notions of “maturity” and the “healthy” (non-
mad) soul, this conservative aspect of Hegel’s idealism takes the 
anthropological form of “habit,” Gewohnheit, which is a social and, so 
to speak, a “counter-revolutionary” form. It is the task of habit to make 
sure idealization functions properly and the individual does not stray 
too far from the norm. Every activity of Geist rests for Hegel on what he 
calls the “mechanism” of habit,67 and every individual is thus formed by 
both self-discipline and that enacted by others (the family, society, etc.). 
Habit in Hegel controls the activity and the content of the soul alike, 
encompassing, further, “all kinds and stages of the activity of spirit.”68 
Since every individuality is founded on a revolutionary nothing (non-
place), it has no stable foundation within the system and must thus be 
shaped, through individuation and habit, in such a way as to direct it 
towards the above-mentioned “Werk der Welt” as its own “subjective” 
goal. This contact with nothing resurfaces in the anthropology in the 
notion of Geist’s “solitude,”69 and its important social dimension also 
comes to the fore in Hegel’s concept of “conscience” (Gewissen), 
described in the Philosophy of Right as one’s “deepest internal solitude 
vis-à-vis oneself,” in which everything “disappears.”70
Despite these (very preliminary) misgivings about the fate of the 
anthropological revolution in Hegel’s concept of the social, it needs to 
be emphasized that Geist remains for him indispensably utopian. It is, 
furthermore, because of (and against) this utopian and revolutionary 
dimension that Hegel feels the need to introduce the counter-
65  §408Z.
66  Hegel 1994, p. 55.
67  §410A.
68  §410Z.
69  See e.g. §392Z., §394Z.
70  Hegel 1970, 7, p. 253.
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revolutionary dimension of the individual and the social. Still, some of 
today’s more radical readings of Hegel’s political thought71 show that at 
some points Hegel’s politics can, at least partially, be subverted from 
within. In other words, the revolutionary foundation defines the beginning 
and progression of the Philosophy of Spirit, as well as re-appears at crucial 
moments, even if sometimes only as a concern. It is perhaps starting 
from this fact, taken together with Hegel’s anthropological analysis, that 
his political philosophy may be further subverted or radicalized.
***
In German Idealism, the utopian connects the end and the 
beginning – both the end of the old (the real) with the beginning of the 
new (the ideal), and the beginning of the new with the fully enacted 
newness (the new real as the non-place of the ideal’s closure). As a 
result, what idealism generates in its revolution, is not knowledge of the 
old as such, but of newness inherent in or proceeding from the old (the 
thing in itself, the natural as such, or the real). It explores the old not 
to know it as such, but to fully transform it. The utopian is, for reason, 
a non-place – but it is also the whole history of reason. All teleology of 
history and spirit in Kant, Fichte or Hegel leads up to the standpoint of 
the present or the future because it is the point it proceeds from, and not 
as a depotentiation, but on the contrary, a further idealist potentiation. 
The origin of the ideal, however, remains in the real, which maintains the 
utopian gap (in order for the ideal itself not to become the “dogmatic” 
status quo) and thus the essentially critical (anti-dogmatic) character 
of the ideal, both at the level of theory and as possible social critique. 
Idealism creates a locus or stage for a critique,72 which lies between the 
real and the revolution as fully actualized. The utopian as the real condition 
guarantees that this condition remains relevant at all time, as long as we 
remain within this ideal gap, so that the utopian work of spirit is not yet 
done. The point of this political theology in German Idealism is by itself 
not correlationist; rather, while the ideal does take for Kant, Fichte, and 
Hegel the historical form of human thought and progress, its definition 
consists in transforming the old from the standpoint of the new as a 
result of a revolt of the real against itself, as an affect or effect of the real. 
71  Such as e.g. the works of Slavoj Žižek or Frank Ruda.
72  In this, the concept of the utopian presented in this paper comes close to Louis Marin’s analy-
sis of the “utopic stage” in Thomas More’s Utopia, although I do not share Marin’s claim that the utopian 
is not itself the object of a critique (“is itself not criticized,” Marin 1984, p. 196). Making the utopian 
immune to critique seems to preclude any re-production, or return, of the revolutionary origin. Marin’s 
claim may be conditioned by the fact that he gets to define utopia as already a “totality” (ibid., p. 195).
Perhaps this is also the point where Schelling’s thought of nature is 
crucially aligned with the German Idealist project. To return to Jacobi’s 
criticism, idealism cannot be a full correlationism without becoming 
solipsism. In order not to become solipsism, it must be a utopian 
offshoot of realism, which means that idealism must be revolutionary in 
order to be viable. Idealism works in the implicit assumption that there 
is something within the real that can objectively lead to a revolutionary 
impetus, that the real cannot exist without revolutionizing itself. 
Understood in this manner as a political-theological theory, idealism 
does not make the real secondary – it makes it primary, but in a different, 
radical way.
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